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I. INTRODUCTION
AST year we warned that the corporation was in significant legal
jeopardy in Texas.' In fact, we suggested that after years of chip-
ping away at the sanctity of the corporate form, the increasing and
unpredictable use of the "single-business-enterprise" approach to corpo-
rate veil piercing could ultimately lead to the evisceration of the liability
shield provided by the corporate form to the shareholders of Texas-based
* Glenn D. West is a partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
** Emmanuel U. Obi is an associate in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas. Mr. West and Mr. Obi express special thanks to Stephen A.
Youngman, a partner in the Business Finance & Restructuring Department of Weil, Got-
shal & Manges LLP, for his assistance with our discussion of Floyd v. Hefner in Part IV of
this Article.
1. See Glenn D. West & Benton B. Bodamer, Corporations, 59 SMU L. REV. 1143,
1143 (2006) (noting that "[u]nless the Texas Supreme Court acts soon, the corporation, as a
distinct legal entity, separate from its shareholders, officers and affiliates, is in serious dan-
ger in Texas").
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businesses. While there were some encouraging judicial developments
during this Survey period, 2 we continue to be concerned by the Texas
courts' 3 inconsistent application of Article 2.21 of the Texas Business
Corporation Act ("Article 2.21").4 In Part II, we continue our discussion
of this trend by highlighting some of the more important decisions by the
Texas courts during this Survey period regarding Article 2.21.
Additionally, we have again sought to provide practical drafting sug-
gestions based on the decisions of Texas courts interpreting agreements
that are commonly involved in corporate transactions. 5 Last year we fo-
cused our discussion of corporate transaction agreement drafting on the
effective use of nonreliance clauses to contractually avoid extra-contrac-
tual fraud claims. 6 In Part III, we continue this discussion and highlight
some disturbing developments that may serve to infuse a level of uncer-
tainty about the extent to which nonreliance clauses will continue to pro-
vide a shield to the imposition of liability for fraud or other extra-
contractual claims.
Finally, in Part IV, we report on an important decision that reaffirms
that officers and directors of Texas corporations owe fiduciary duties only
to the shareholders of the corporations for whom they serve and not to
the creditors of those corporations, even in the so-called "zone of
insolvency."
II. THE SANCTITY OF THE CORPORATE FORM IN TEXAS
Texas courts have long purported to uphold the importance of the cor-
poration as an entity separate and distinct from its officers, shareholders,
and affiliates. 7 Indeed, as noted during this Survey period, "[i]t is an ele-
2. Although the Survey period for this Article is January 1, 2006 through December
31, 2006, relevant cases past this point were included as permitted up to the time this
Article was submitted for publication.
3. As in previous years, relevant courts, for purposes of this Survey, are limited to
Texas state courts, federal district courts in Texas and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit interpreting issues of Texas law, when appropriate. Since this Survey's
scope is limited to Texas corporate law issues, neither purely federal corporate issues nor
federal or state securities issues are discussed.
4. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr Am. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003). It should be noted that for
corporations formed on or after January 1, 2006, for corporations formed prior to January
1, 2006, that self-elect, and as of January 1, 2010, for all corporations, the Texas Business
Organizations Code ("TBOC") replaces Article 2.21 as controlling law. This change in no
way affects the law substantively, however, as the requirements of the TBOC are identical
to those of Article 2.21). See TEX. Bus. ORGs. CODE ANN., tit. 2, §§ 21.223-225 (Vernon
2005).
5. See West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 2.
6. Id. at 1156.
7. See West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1143-48. See also Glenn D. West & Susan
Y. Chao, Corporations, 56 SMU L. REV. 1395, 1396-97 (2003) (noting that
[d]espite frequent pronouncements by Texas courts that the corporate form
is not to be easily avoided or ignored, Texas courts have manifested a reluc-
tance to unequivocally afford corporate officers, directors and shareholders
the basic protections of that corporate form: namely, freedom from liability
for the obligations of the corporation with whom the corporate officers, di-
rectors and shareholders are affiliated-protection that has always been the
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mentary principle of corporate law that a corporation and its stockhold-
ers are separate entities ...,8 and "[a] bedrock principle of corporate law
is that an individual can incorporate a business and thereby normally
shield himself from personal liability for the corporation's contractual ob-
ligations."9 Nevertheless, Texas courts frequently impose liability for cor-
porate-level actions and contracts on the shareholders (including parent
corporations), officers, or other affiliates of that corporation based on a
myriad of theories. 1° In past surveys, we have been particularly focused
on the inappropriateness of any of those theories in imposing liability on
nonparty affiliates of the named corporate parties to contractual obliga-
tions for such contractual obligations, or for any matter relating to or
arising from such corporate contractual obligations, in direct contraven-
tion of Article 2.21.11 Specifically, pursuant to Article 2.21, the only
means by which a shareholder or affiliate of a corporate obligor may be
liable for the obligations of that corporate obligor based on "alter ego,"
"actual fraud," "constructive fraud," "sham to perpetuate a fraud," or
any other "similar theory" is by demonstrating that the shareholder or
affiliate of the corporate obligor "caused the corporation to be used for
the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the
obligee primarily for [such shareholder's or affiliate's] direct personal
benefit."' 2 Article 2.21 further provides that the specified means of im-
posing liability (based on actual fraud for the direct personal benefit of
the shareholder or affiliate of the corporate obligor) is "exclusive and
preempts any other liability ... under common law or otherwise.
13
During this Survey period, we were encouraged by the clarity of many
of the Texas courts' decisions in properly applying Article 2.21. On the
other hand, there remains reason for continued concern based on the fail-
ure of other Texas courts to clearly and properly apply Article 2.21. De-
spite encouraging developments during the Survey period, Texas courts
still do not apply Article 2.21 in every situation involving an attempted
most "fundamental" purpose for the formation of the corporate entity and
protection that was specifically confirmed and enhanced by the Texas legisla-
ture in Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporations Act
(internal citations omitted)).
8. In re HSM Kennewick, L.P., 347 B.R. 569, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing In
re Murchison, 54 B.R. 721 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985)).
9. Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tex. 2006).
10. See West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1145-46. During this Survey period, there
were also several cases that discussed the applicability of veil piercing theories to limited
liability companies in Texas. See, e.g., In re JNS Aviation, LLC, 350 B.R. 283, 299 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Kilroy, 2006 WL 3720366, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2006).
11. West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1148-53; West & Chao, supra note 7, at 1407-08;
Glenn D. West & Adam D. Nelson, Corporations, 57 SMU L. REV. 799, 804-09 (2004);
Glenn D. West & Brandy L. Treadway, Corporations, 55 SMU L. REV. 803, 815-16 (2002);
Glenn D. West, Corporations, 54 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1227 (2001); Glenn D. West & Sarah
B. Stacy, Corporations, 58 SMU L. REV. 719, 726 (2005).
12. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A)( 2) (Vernon 2003); see also S. Union Co.
v. Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex. 2003) (reaffirming that Article 2.21 is the "exclusive"
means of imposing liability on a parent, shareholder, or affiliate for corporate contractual
obligations).
13. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art 2.21(B) (Vernon 2003).
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imposition of liability on any subsidiary, parent, affiliate (including an
officer acting solely on behalf of a corporation) or shareholder of a cor-
poration for the corporation's contractual obligations, or "any matter re-
lating to or arising from" that corporation's contractual obligations. 14
A. TEXAS CASES PROPERLY APPLYING ARTICLE 2.21
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the most
recent effort to employ a common-law theory to impose liability on a
nonparty affiliate of a corporate obligor for that corporate obligor's con-
tractual obligations. 15 In Willis v. Donnelly,16 the Texas Supreme Court
reinforced the precedent established in Southern Union Co. v. City of
Edinburg17 and upheld the clear language of Article 2.21.18
Willis involved a commercial dispute stemming from the formation of a
spa business in Houston. Michael Willis and several others established
two corporations to operate the business. First, the group created Urban
Retreat of Houston, Inc. ("URH"), which was the entity that would oper-
ate the initial spa. Second, Willis/Hite Enterprises, Inc. ("WHI") was es-
tablished to serve as the "umbrella company" into which the initial URH
and other subsequent spa companies would be integrated "if the concept
worked in multiple locations. '" 9 Willis was a shareholder, director, and
officer of both corporations. After the establishment of the corporate
entities, the group contacted Donnelly, who was a successful hair stylist
and co-owner of Hairmasters of Houston, Inc. The parties agreed that
Donnelly would join the business, and they memorialized this in a letter
agreement. In the letter agreement, Donnelly agreed to use his best ef-
forts to transfer his hair-salon business to the spa and also to manage the
spa. In consideration for this obligation, URH and WHI promised Don-
nelly a salary and future stock transfers that were, in part, contingent on
the new business reaching certain performance goals. As the business
progressed, even though it did poorly overall, the conditions for certain
stock transfers to Donnelly were eventually satisfied. 20
The litigation in Willis commenced when Willis sued Donnelly for fail-
ure to pay a separate loan that Willis had made to Donnelly. Donnelly
counterclaimed by alleging breach of the letter agreement against the two
corporate parties thereto, as well as Willis individually. At trial, the jury
found that WHE and URH had indeed breached the letter agreement by
failing to transfer stock to Donnelly. In addition, the jury also deter-
14. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21(A)( 2).
15. Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 273; see also West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1148 (noting
that recent Texas cases "demonstrate a clear need and opportunity for the Texas Supreme
Court to unambiguously extinguish the inappropriate application of common-law veil-
piercing theories to Texas cases covered by Article 2.21" (internal citations omitted)).
16. Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 272.
17. See S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d. 74, 87 (Tex. 2003).
18. Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 272.




mined that Willis was individually liable under the letter agreement be-
cause he ratified the agreement. Both parties appealed the decision, and
the court of appeals: (1) held that the trial record supported the liability
determination for breach of contract; and (2) affirmed the jury's imposi-
tion of individual liability against Willis based on the determination that
he ratified the letter agreement. 21
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the supreme court rejected the
lower courts' imposition of liability for breach of contract on Willis in his
individual capacity, clearly and unequivocally rejecting the ratification
theory adopted by the lower courts. The supreme court started its review
of the case by noting that "[a]s a matter of law, the corporate shield from
liability should operate in these circumstances .... [because] [alvoidance
of personal liability is not only sanctioned by the law; it is an essential
reason that entrepreneurs like Willis choose to incorporate their busi-
nesses." 22 The supreme court next discussed the evolution of Texas law
in the context of shareholder liability, noting the precedent that it created
in the seminal case of Castleberry v. Branscum23 and how this precedent
was subsequently minimized by the Texas legislature. 24 The supreme
court then concluded that "[u]nder current law, by statute, a shareholder
'may not be held liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect to
... a contractual obligation of the corporation... on the basis that the
holder ... is or was the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis of
actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud or other similar
theory . . .,"' except pursuant to the express provisions of Article 2.21.25
In applying Article 2.21 to the ratification theory asserted by Donnelly,
the supreme court noted that neither of the two exceptions contained in
Article 2.21 were applicable. First, the supreme court explained that a
shareholder may be held individually liable if it is proven that the "share-
holder 'caused the corporation to be used for the purposes of perpetrat-
ing and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the
direct personal benefit of the shareholder.'" 2 6 However, the supreme
court ultimately determined that this statutory exception was not availa-
ble because the jury had rejected Donnelly's fraud claim.2 7 Second, the
supreme court also considered the statutory exception that allows for the
imposition of individual liability on a shareholder "where the shareholder
'expressly... agrees to be personally liable to the obligee for the obliga-
tion." 2 8 In this context, the supreme court held that this exception was
21. Id. at 269.
22. Id. at 271.
23. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986).
24. Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 271 (noting that "[t]he business community was displeased
with the flexible approach to piercing the corporate veil embraced in Castleberry, and in
response the Legislature in 1989 narrowly prescribed the circumstances under which a
shareholder can be held liable for corporate debts.").
25. Id. at 272 (quoting TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE § 21.223(a)).
26. Id. at 272 (quoting TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE § 21.223(a)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 272 (quoting TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE § 21.225(1)).
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not available. 29 In particular, the supreme court found no evidence that
Willis expressly agreed to assume personal liability under the letter agree-
ment. Rather, the supreme court found the factual record replete with
clear evidentiary indications that Willis did not intend to be personally
bound by the agreement. Willis, in fact, did not sign the agreement, and,
while Donnelly asserted during trial that Willis previously agreed to "live
up to the letter agreement," the supreme court found that Donnelly pro-
vided no evidentiary substantiation as to whether Willis made such asser-
tions in his individual or corporate capacity.30 According to the supreme
court, "[t]o impose liability against Willis under a common law theory of
implied ratification because [he] accepted the benefits of the letter agree-
ment would contravene the statutory imperative that, absent actual fraud
or an express agreement to assume personal liability, a shareholder may
not be held liable for contractual obligations of the corporation. '31 As a
result, the supreme court held that "characterizing the theory as 'ratifica-
tion' rather than 'alter ego' is simply asserting a 'similar theory' of deriva-
tive liability that is covered by the statute. '32
Willis provides a prime example of how a court should treat the issue of
shareholder liability. For corporate practitioners, it provides a dose of
healthy optimism that the Texas Supreme Court has affirmatively set a
judicial tone that reaffirms the vitality of the corporate form as a barrier
to the imposition of individual liability. In addition, early indications are
that Texas appellate courts are responding and following the clear man-
date that Willis provides. 33
Two of the courts of appeals' decisions decided during this Survey pe-
riod are particularly clear examples of Texas courts properly applying the
provisions of Article 2.21 to cases in which a party is attempting to im-
pose personal liability on the basis of an alter-ego theory. First, in Bates
v. De Tournillion,34 the plaintiff filed suit against Bates Kwik Change,
Inc. ("BKC") and its shareholder Charles Bates asserting claims for
breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and theft,
arising out of a lease agreement between the plaintiff, as lessor, and BKC,
as lessee. The plaintiff's petition sought to impose liability against Bates
in his individual capacity based on an alter-ego theory. Upon the conclu-
sion of a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff
against both BKC and Charles Bates, individually.




32. Id. at 273.
33. See e.g., A.M. Barbar Corp. v. Hellriegel, No. 09-05-077 CV, 2006 WL 2506417, at
*3 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet.); Goodman Sales Co. v. ASHA Distrib., Inc., No.
H-05-1260, 2006 WL 2469357, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2006, no pet.); Metal Bldg. Components, LP
v. Raley, 2007 WL 74316, at*12 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
34. Bates v. de Tournillion, No. 07-03-0257-CV, 2006 WL 265474 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo Feb. 3, 2006, no pet.).
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Imposition of liability on a corporate shareholder for the contractual
obligation of the corporation on an alter ego or similar theory re-
quires proof that the shareholder (1) caused the corporation to be
used for the purpose of perpetrating; and (2) did perpetrate an actual
fraud on the contractual obligee primarily for the direct personal
benefit of the shareholder.3 5
The court then concluded that the factual record of the case did not sup-
port the trial court's determination. In particular, the court held that,
despite the plaintiff's showing that Bates minimally capitalized the corpo-
ration, the plaintiff provided no evidence of Bates's use of the corpora-
tion to perpetrate a fraud. 36 Additionally, the court rejected the
plaintiff's contention that Bates's removal of BKC's equipment and in-
ventory from the premises leased from plaintiff under the lease agree-
ment supported the imposition of personal liability. The court found that,
"[e]ven inferring an intent to deceive from [Bates's] removal of the
equipment and inventory to the storage facility, the evidence fails to meet
the requirements of Article 2.21.A(2). '3 7 In fact, the court found "no
evidence [Bates] personally made any use of the items or that his actions
were otherwise for his direct personal benefit. '38 Because the plaintiff
could point to no evidence in the record satisfying the statutory perqui-
sites of Article 2.21.A(2), i.e, BKC being used to perpetuate an actual
fraud for the direct personal benefit of Bates, there was not a basis on
which the court could properly impose liability on Bates, as the share-
holder of BKC, under the lease. 39
B. TEXAS CASES FAILING TO PROPERLY APPLY ARTICLE 2.21
In contrast to the previous decisions is Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v.
Kajima International, Inc. 40 The Formosa case involved, in part, a claim
predicated on the single-business-enterprise doctrine-a veil-piercing
theory covered in last year's Survey.4 1
In Formosa, Kajima International, Inc. ("Kajima") and Formosa Plas-
tics Corporation, USA ("Formosa USA") entered into a series of con-
struction contracts.42 The contracts at issue were executed after Kajima,
an industrial construction company, successfully bid for work on one of
Formosa USA's plants. Kajima claimed Formosa USA fraudulently in-
duced it to enter into the contract by withholding specific information
relating to the work. As a consequence, Kajima asserted it was misled
into making artificially low bids on the contracts. Kajima filed its original
35. Id. at *2 (relying on TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21).




40. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2006, pet. filed).
41. See West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1145-53.
42. Formosa, at 444.
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action in Texas state court asserting breach of contract and fiaud, among
other claims, against Formosa USA and its subsidiary Formosa Plastic
Corp., Texas ("Formosa Texas"). Because Formosa Texas was not a party
to the contracts, Kajima's claims against both defendants were predi-
cated, in part, on the single-business-enterprise theory. Kajima sought to
merge Formosa USA and Formosa Texas under the single-business-enter-
prise theory in order to make Formosa USA liable for the actions and
alleged fraud of Formosa Texas. Kajima sought and obtained a partial
summary judgment based on the finding that Formosa USA and Formosa
Texas were a single-business enterprise as a matter of law prior to the
trial before a jury. At trial, the jury determined that Formosa USA had
defrauded Kajima.43
One of the many issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred by
granting Kajima's motion for partial summary judgment based on the
finding that Formosa USA and Formosa Texas, its wholly owned subsidi-
ary, were operated as a single-business enterprise. As a result of this par-
tial summary judgment, "the jury was instructed that it could consider the
conduct of Formosa Texas when deciding the liability of Formosa
USA."'44 Kajima claimed that Formosa USA and Formosa Texas were
operated as a single-business enterprise because: (1) the companies had
common employees during the relevant period of time; (2) the companies
shared common offices; and (3) the companies had a centralized or coor-
dinated accounting system with respect to the approval of construction
details. Formosa USA countered by arguing that Article 2.21 applied and
required that Kajima make a showing of actual fraud. 45
As to the viability of Kajima's single-business-enterprise claim against
the defendants in Formosa, the court first addressed the issue of Article
2.21's general applicability to the facts of the case. In particular, the court
correctly noted that Article 2.21 not only applies to contractual obliga-
tions, but also to "any matter relating to or arising from the obligation."
Therefore, the court "assume[d], without deciding," that despite the fact
that the case was submitted to the jury on the issue of fraud, the fraud
issue was derivative of the parties' contractual relationship because the
fraud related to and arose out of that contractual obligation.46 As a re-
43. Id. at 445.
44. Id. at 459.
45. Id.
46. This is an important issue that has been frequently overlooked by the courts. A
claim of fraud arising out of a contractual relationship is "a matter relating to or arising
from" that contractual relationship and therefore within the applicable matters to which
Article 2.21 is directly applicable. West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1150 n.39 and 1158
n.90; West & Nelson, supra note 11, at 806 n.40; West & Chao, supra note 7, at 1408 n.99.
See also In re Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ("Courts recognize the use of 'any' dispute 'arising out of or relating
to' as broad language that expressly includes tort and other claims relating to the contrac-
tual relationship."); Clark v. Power Mktg. Direct, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 796, 798-99 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (forum selection clause requiring that "any action, claim
or demand arising under or as a result of this Agreement shall be filed in Franklin County,
[Vol. 60
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suit, Article 2.21 was directly applicable to this case. 47
Notwithstanding a finding that Article 2.21 was generally applicable,
the court went on to conclude that Article 2.21 did not protect a subsidi-
ary of a parent obligor from liability under the single-business-enterprise
theory. Rather, according to this court, Article 2.21 only protects share-
holders of the corporate obligor from exposure to the contractually re-
lated obligations of that corporate obligor. Because the corporate obligor
(i.e., the entity that was the named party to the contracts) was Formosa
USA (the parent company) and not Formosa Texas (the subsidiary), the
court held that Article 2.21 did not actually protect Formosa USA from
exposure to a claim based on the actions of its subsidiary, Formosa Texas,
related to the contractual obligations entered into by Formosa USA. 48
Moreover, the court also noted, without discussion, that "[b]ecause the
evidence of Formosa USA's own fraud is sufficient to support the jury's
finding that Formosa USA committed fraud, Formosa has not been
harmed by the trial court's ruling on the single-business enterprise. '49
Because the trial court had ruled that the jury could consider the ac-
tions of Formosa Texas in determining the liability of Formosa USA, it is
difficult to know for certain how the court could be so confident that the
jury found Formosa USA guilty of its own fraud. Having thus concluded,
however, the court then goes to great lengths to show how Formosa Texas
and Formosa USA nonetheless should be considered a single-business en-
terprise as a matter of law. The court reaches this conclusion based on
the fact that the companies shared certain employees and common of-
fices, used a centralized accounting system, shared the name "Formosa,"
and performed services for each other.50 Each of the facts relied upon by
the court to conclude that Formosa USA and Formosa Texas were a sin-
gle-business enterprise as a matter of law, are common facts applicable to
most parent-subsidiary relationships. Like last year's concern with a
number of cases that appeared to impose liability under the single-busi-
ness-enterprise theory without any finding of wrongful conduct, holdings
such as these cast doubt on the continued efficacy of the corporate shield
in Texas, and hopefully the Texas Supreme Court will find an opportunity
to make the single-business-enterprise theory a thing of the past.5'
Another disturbing Texas decision regarding the applicability of Article
2.21 during the Survey period is In re Morrison.52 Morrison involved a
determination of whether a debt was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy
Code. Western Builders of Amarillo, Inc. ("Western Builders") had en-
tered into a written subcontract with Morrison Excavation, Inc. ("Morri-
Ohio" held to cover tort claims of fraudulent inducement and was not limited to contrac-
tual disputes under the Agreement.).
47. Formosa, 216 S.W.3d at 461.
48. Id. at 463.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1145-53.
52. 361 B.R. 107 (Bankr. W.D. Tex 2007).
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son Excavation"). David Morrison was the primary shareholder as well
as the president of Morrison Builders. As part of the decision to engage
Morrison Excavation as a subcontractor, Western Builders required that
Morrison Excavation provide a financial statement. David Morrison per-
sonally delivered (by fax) a copy of Morrison Excavation's financial state-
ment to Western Builders. The financial statement contained a
significant overstatement of Morrison Excavation's accounts receivable.
At the time the statement was delivered it is unclear whether Mr. Morri-
son knew of this error in his company's financial statement, but there was
significant evidence that, before the subcontract was actually signed or
funded, he knew of the error in the financial statement that had been
submitted on behalf of Morrison Excavation.
As a result of cost overruns that Morrison Excavation could not fund,
Western Builders ultimately terminated the subcontract with Morrison
Excavation and incurred substantial damages by completing the project
through other subcontractors. David Morrison thereafter filed personal
bankruptcy. Western Builders argued that had they known the true fi-
nancial situation of Morrison Builders they never would have entered
into the subcontract. Western Builders claimed that David Morrison was
personally liable for Western Builders losses arising out of the subcon-
tract with Morrison Excavation because "Morrison caused Morrison Ex-
cavation to be used for the purpose of perpetuating a fraud and did
perpetuate an actual fraud on Western Builders primarily for his own per-
sonal benefit." '53
Morrison argued that he had acted only on behalf of Morrison Excava-
tion, and not for his own direct personal benefit pursuant to Article 2.21.
The court, however, noted that "Morrison was the majority stockholder
and president of Morrison Excavation... [and] [a]ny benefit to Morrison
Excavation was a personal benefit to Morrison ... [because] he needed
the doors to stay open to draw his large salary and maintain his
53. Id. at 117. Western Builders also argued and the court held that even if Morrison
was not liable under Article 2.21, Texas law allows "individual liability on the part of a
corporate agent for misrepresentations made by him." Id. at 120. As a result, since Morri-
son personally participated in the delivery of (or subsequent failure to correct) the mis-
leading financial statements of Morrison Excavation, "he can be personally liable for such
action." Id. at 121. We have previously suggested that, contrary to this court's opinion,
the fraud committed by a corporate agent solely in the furtherance of the business of his
corporate principal is within the coverage of Article 2.21. See West & Stasny, supra note
11, at 726; West & Nelson, supra note 11, at 804-09; West & Chao, supra note 7, at 1403-08;
West & Treadway, supra note 11, at 814-16; West, supra note 11, at 1226-37. Article 2.21
covers not only piercing-the-veil theories such as alter ego, but also "actual fraud ... or
other similar theory." Whatever the theory pursuant to which a shareholder or affiliate of
the corporation is made to answer for that corporation's contractual obligations or any
other matter related to or arising from that contractual obligation (including claims of ex-
tra-contractual fraud), Article 2.21 requires a showing that such fraud was for the "direct
personal benefit" of the person sought to be charged with such liability. Otherwise, Article
2.21 truly does not protect the owner of a corporation, who also serves as an officer of that
corporation, because "[u]nder Texas law, a corporation or other legal entity can conduct
business only through natural persons." In re L&D Interests, Inc., 350 B.R. 391, 400




"Direct personal benefit" cannot possibly mean the indirect benefit a
shareholder obtains by owning the majority or even all of the stock of a
corporation. Similarly, "direct personal benefit" cannot mean the salary
that such a shareholder receives as a corporate officer. Such benefits
would always be present in any closely held corporation, and Article 2.21
clearly requires proof of an actual fraud being perpetrated through the
use of the corporate form with the proceeds derived from that fraud "di-
rectly" benefiting the individual shareholder or affiliate of the corporate
obligor. The court cited no evidence showing a direct use, by David Mor-
rison personally, of funds derived from the fraudulent procurement of the
subcontract by Morrison Excavation from Western Builders. 55 Other
cases that have discussed the meaning of "direct personal benefit" have
tended to require a specific use of corporate funds (procured through the
fraud) to fund personal (rather than corporate) expenses. 56 To make a
showing of "direct personal benefit" simply by noting that because Morri-
son "ran the company and made all of the decisions regarding its opera-
tion[,J... [a]ny benefit to Morrison Excavation was a personal benefit to
Morrison[,]" is to make the statute meaningless.
III. DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS-AVOIDING
FRAUD CLAIMS THROUGH THE EFFECTIVE
USE OF NONRELIANCE CLAUSES
As noted in prior surveys, disputes over corporate contractual arrange-
ments are rarely limited to breach of contract claims.57 Inevitably, extra-
contractual tort claims of fraud and misrepresentation against one of the
parties or their officers result from nearly every contractual dispute. This
reality persists despite frequent pronouncements by the Texas courts that
they have generally resisted the "contortion '58 of contract and tort law
and have instead adopted the principal that "if a contract spells out the
parties' respective rights regarding a particular matter, the contract, not
common-law tort principles, governs any dispute about that matter. '59
Stated differently, "[a]lthough a party's actions may breach duties in tort,
contract, or both, Texas law is clear that 'mere nonfeasance under a con-
tract creates liability only for breach of contract."' 60 Nevertheless, as
54. In re Morrison, 361 B.R. at 120.
55. Western Builders did claim that Morrison used some advance payments for per-
sonal use, but the court did not point to any specific evidence of an actual diversion of
Morrison Excavation funds to the personal use of Morrison.
56. See Bates, 2006 WL 265474, at *3.
57. West & Bodamer, supra, note 1, at 1157; West & Stasny, supra note 11, at 721.
58. See Glenn D. West, Avoiding Extra-Contractual Fraud Claims in Portfolio Com-
pany Sales Transactions-Is "Walk-Away" Deal Certainty Achievable for the Seller?, Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP Private Equity Alert (March, 2006), available at www.weil.com.
59. Castle Tex. Prod. L.P. v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003,
pet. denied).
60. Lookshin v. Union Planters Bank, No. H-05-3834, 2006 WL 3147330, at *10 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 30, 2006).
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noted by the Texas Supreme Court during this Survey period, there has
long been a tension between "the need to keep tort law from overwhelm-
ing contract law so that private agreements are not subject to readjust-
ment by judges and juries," 61 and the perceived public policy need to
avoid treating a contract that was procured "by fraud [as] simply another
contract dispute. 62
While that tension would appear to be easily resolvable, since no one
would want to countenance "fraud," it is in fact a very difficult tension to
resolve because fraud encompasses much more than most people believe.
For example, "[a] contractual promise made with no intention of per-
forming may give rise to an action for fraudulent inducement. ' 63 Indeed,
"a party may bring a fraudulent inducement claim even if the terms of the
promise are later subsumed into a contract. ' 64 Furthermore, "while
breach alone is no evidence of fraudulent intent, breach combined with
'slight circumstantial evidence' of fraud is enough to support a verdict for
fraudulent inducement. ' 65 Thus, if one makes a promise in a written
agreement, any subsequent breach is simply a breach of contract, but if
one makes a promise that induces someone to enter into a contract in
which that promise is memorialized, personal liability for fraud may exist.
Fraud can encompass both affirmative statements made and, in certain
circumstances, a failure to disclose information that "could not have been
uncovered [by the other party] by reasonable investigation and in-
quiry."' 66 For sophisticated parties who have carefully crafted their agree-
ments to strictly allocate risk among themselves introducing these
uncertain tort concepts into their business dealings may result in exactly
the effect that the Texas courts claim they seek to avoid, i.e., allowing
''private agreements [to be] subject to readjustment by judges and
juries."'67
We have noted in the past that properly drafted disclaimer of reliance
and merger provisions set forth in agreements between sophisticated par-
ties can greatly reduce the possibility of these extra-contractual claims
being sustained. 68 We even suggested that Texas was a state with a partic-
ularly strong record of "holding parties to the express terms of their writ-
61. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2006).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 304.
64. Id. at 305. Interestingly, New York law does not appear to permit a fraudulent
inducement claim to be premised on representations that are actually made a part of the
written contract. Wall v. CSX Transp., Inc., 471 F.3d 410, 417 (2d Cir. 2006). But the
existence of a contract in New York does not foreclose a claim for fraudulent inducement
based on a misrepresentation if "the misrepresentation is collateral to the contract it in-
duced." Id. at 416.
65. Tony Gullo, 212 S.W.3d at 305.
66. Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 369 F. Supp.2d 848, 858
(E.D. Tex. 2004).
67. Tony Gullo, 212 S.W.3d at 306.
68. West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1160-66; West & Stasny, supra note 11, at 721-
26; West & Nelson, supra note 11, at 814-19.
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ten agreements. '69 Unfortunately, during this Survey period there were
some disturbing Texas cases that potentially will erode the degree of con-
fidence with which sophisticated parties to a corporate transaction can
reliably depend on the written agreement they fashioned for themselves
to definitively allocate risk.
A. TEXAS CASES NARROWLY INTERPRETING SCHLUMBERGER
In last year's Survey we noted a consistent series of Texas cases that,
relying upon the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Schlumberger Tech-
nology Corp. v. Swanson,70 confirmed that sophisticated parties may con-
tractually disclaim reliance on extra-contractual representations and
defeat any claims of fraud, including fraudulent inducement, that may
arise in connection with or relate to the subject matter of a written con-
tract. 71 While there continued to be cases during this Survey period that
reaffirmed the applicability of Schlumberger to any contract involving so-
phisticated parties, who have chosen to define their agreements exclu-
sively by written contract, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in
Houston provided an exceedingly narrow interpretation of Schlumberger
in Warehouse Associates Corp. Centre II, Inc. v. Celotex.72 Celotex, cur-
rently on appeal, countered years of a consistently broad analysis of the
Schlumberger precedent.
Celotex involved the sale of real property under a contract that in-
cluded the following extensive "as-is" and "waiver-of-reliance" provision:
OTHER THAN THE WARRANTIES OF TITLE CONTAINED
IN THE DEED, PURCHASER ACKNOWLEDGES AND
AGREES THAT SELLER HAS NOT MADE, DOES NOT MAKE
AND SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY REPRESENTATIONS,
WARRANTIES, PROMISES, COVENANTS, AGREEMENTS
OR GUARANTIES OF ANY KIND OR CHARACTER WHAT-
SOEVER, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ORAL OR
WRITTEN, PAST, PRESENT OR FUTURE, OF, AS TO, CON-
CERNING OR WITH RESPECT TO (A) THE NATURE, QUAL-
ITY OR CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY, INCLUDING
WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE WATER, SOIL AND GEOL-
OGY, (B) THE INCOME TO BE DERIVED FROM THE PROP-
ERTY, (C) THE SUITABILITY OF THE PROPERTY FOR ANY
AND ALL ACTIVITIES AND USES WHICH PURCHASER
MAY CONDUCT THEREON, (D) THE COMPLIANCE OF OR
BY THE PROPERTY OR ITS OPERATION WITH ANY LAWS,
RULES, ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS OF ANY APPLI-
CABLE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OR BODY ... (E)
THE HABITABILITY, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF THE PROPERTY, OR (F)
69. West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1156.
70. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Tex. 1997).
71. West & Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1156-66.
72. Warehouse Assocs. Corp. Centre II v. Celotex Corp., 192 S.W.3d 225, 234 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
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ANY OTHER MATTER WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY,
AND SPECIFICALLY THAT SELLER HAS NOT MADE, AND
DOES NOT MAKE AND SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY
REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SOLID WASTE, AS DE-
FINED BY THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY REGULATIONS AT 40 C.F.R., PART 261, OR THE
DISPOSAL OR EXISTENCE, IN OR ON THE PROPERTY, OF
ANY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE, AS DEFINED BY THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE COM-
PENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, AS AMENDED,
AND APPLICABLE STATE LAWS, AND REGULATIONS
PROMULGATED THEREUNDER. PURCHASER FURTHER
ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT HAVING BEEN
GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO INSPECT THE PROPERTY,
PURCHASER IS RELYING SOLELY ON ITS OWN INVESTI-
GATION OF THE PROPERTY AND NOT ON ANY INFORMA-
TION PROVIDED OR TO BE PROVIDED BY THE SELLER.
PURCHASER FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES
THAT ANY IN FORMATION [sic] PROVIDED OR TO BE PRO-
VIDED WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY WAS OB-
TAINED FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES AND THAT
SELLER HAS NOT MADE ANY INDEPENDENT INVESTIGA-
TION OR VERIFICATION OF SUCH INFORMATION. PUR-
CHASER FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT
THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY AT CLOSING SHALL BE
MADE ON AN "AS IS, WHERE IS" CONDITION AND BASIS
"WITH ALL FAULTS[.]" 73
Celotex Corporation operated an asphalt-shingle manufacturing plant
on the property for a number of years prior to entering into the contract
for sale of the land at issue in the case. While negotiating the sale, Celo-
tex provided the buyer with a partial environmental report indicating that
asbestos had been used in the buildings on the property but omitted in-
formation about asbestos contamination in the soil and the use of asbes-
tos in the shingle manufacturing process.
Pursuant to the previously quoted provision, the written contract with
the buyer "specifically disclaimed any representations, warranties,
promises, covenants[,] and guaranties of any kind" other than the warran-
ties of title contained in the deed.7 4 Additionally, the buyer was expressly
entitled to conduct inspections, tests, and investigations "as it deemed
necessary to determine the suitability of the property.. ., and [the buyer]
agreed that it was relying solely on its own inspection and investigation of
the property. '75 The parties also agreed that "the sale of the property at
closing would be on an 'as is, where is' condition and basis 'with all
faults." 76 During the agreed upon inspection period in which the buyer
73. Id. at 235.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 227-28.
76. Id. at 228.
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would have the right to terminate, Celotex discovered asbestos in the soil
but did not disclose this finding to the buyer. The buyer conducted an
independent environmental assessment of the soil but did not test for as-
bestos. After the inspection period and closing, the buyer discovered sig-
nificant asbestos contamination in the soil and brought suit against
Celotex alleging fraud and misrepresentation. Presumably based on the
extensive "as is" and "nonreliance" clause quoted above, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Celotex on all of the buyer's
claims.77
On appeal, the Celotex court addressed the extent to which Schlum-
berger had overruled prior Texas Supreme Court precedent that had cre-
ated two exceptions to the enforceability of "as is" and "waiver of
reliance" clauses. Specifically, the court noted that in Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates,78 the supreme court excluded
the following two situations from its general willingness to enforce specif-
ically negotiated "as is" and "waiver of reliance" clauses entered into by
sophisticated parties represented by counsel: "(1) the buyer was induced
to enter into the contract containing that language by a fraudulent repre-
sentation or concealment of information by the seller[;] or (2) the seller
engaged in conduct that impaired, obstructed, or interfered with the
buyer's inspection of the property being sold."'79 The court referred to
these two exceptions as the "fraudulent inducement exception" and the
"impairment-of-inspection exception." 80 After reviewing Schlumberger
in detail, the court concluded that both exceptions provided in Prudential
"still stand, subject to a small exception to the fraudulent inducement
exception." According to the court in Celotex, the "small exception" to
the "fraudulent inducement exception" created by Schlumberger was the
limited factual situation confronted by the court in Schlumberger, i.e., the
resolution of a long-running dispute designed to avoid litigation and to
end a business relationship. According to the Celotex court, in that situa-
tion alone, a claim of fraudulent inducement is rendered ineffective by a
nonreliance provision.
The decision in Celotex stands in stark contrast to prior consistent read-
ings of Schlumberger that afforded broad enforceability to "as-is" and
"waiver-of-reliance" provisions in contracts between sophisticated busi-
ness persons, regardless of the context of the particular agreement in
question. Moreover, the most commonly plead fraud based on extra-con-
tractual statements is "fraudulent inducement." There is little value to a
nonreliance provision if a disappointed party can eliminate the effective-
ness of a nonreliance clause simply by claiming that the extra-contractual
representations or nondisclosures that such party disclaimed reliance
upon fraudulently induced such party into entering into the contract.
77. Id.
78. 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
79. Celotex, 192 S.W.3d at 230.
80. Id. at 231.
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The very existence of a nonreliance clause, particularly one as exten-
sive as the one in Celotex, should require extra diligence on the part of
the buyer. Even in the absence of a nonreliance clause, Texas law states
that a plaintiff "cannot recover if he blindly relies upon a misrepresenta-
tion the falsity of which would be patent to him if he had utilized his
opportunity to make a cursory examination or investigation." 81 Indeed,
"a duty to inquire is created when 'such information is known as would
prompt a person exercising reasonable care to acquire knowledge of the
fact in question.... [and] [w]hen those inquiries are not made, the person
is chargeable with knowledge that would have been acquired through dil-
igent inquiry."' 82 While there may be evidence of less than full disclosure
by the seller in this case, it is not clear that Warehouse Associates fulfilled
its obligations of diligent inquiry. Between sophisticated parties, negoti-
ating at arms length, the only claim of fraudulent inducement that should
be available to defeat the effectiveness of a nonreliance provision should
be a claim that the seller deliberately prevented the buyer from discover-
ing material information that was "peculiarly" within the knowledge of
the seller.83 This does not appear to be such a case. Indeed, the Celotex
court specifically held that Celotex did not impair Warehouse Associ-
ates's inspection of the property, and a soil test presumably would have
revealed the asbestos contamination. 84
Equally as disturbing as the decision in Celotex is the decision of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in Nu-
trasep, LLC v. TOPC Texas LLC.85 Nutrasep involved a dispute over a
Technology Licensing Agreement and a Manufacturing Supply Agree-
ment. Nutrasep, LLC ("NTS") purported to have developed a system
for improving the quality of soybean oil. TOPC was an agricultural coop-
erative that produced soybean oil. NTS sued TOPC for breach of the
Technology License Agreement and the Manufacturing Supply Agree-
ment based on TOPC's failure to make the required payments to NTS
under the agreements. TOPC alleged in response that NTS had misrep-
resented the uniqueness of NTS's technology and the amount of invest-
ment that would be required by TOPC. In a motion for summary
judgment, NTS asserted that the "fraud" counterclaims of TOPC should
fail as a matter of law because of the merger and nonreliance clauses in
the agreements. The clauses in each of the agreements were substantially
similar. The clauses in the Technology Licensing Agreement read as
follows:
81. In re Webber, 350 B.R. 344, 372-73 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Lewis, 343 F.3d
at 546).
82. Id. at 373.
83. See e.g., DynCorp v. GTE Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 308, 319-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re
Marketxt Holdings Corp., No. 05-01-52, 2006 WL 2864963, at *11-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2006).
84. Celotex, 192 S.W.3d at 241.
85. No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL 3063432 (W.D. Tex Oct. 27, 2006).
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3.3 Licensee, by execution hereof, acknowledges, covenants and
agrees that it has not been induced in any way by NTS or its employ-
ees to enter into this Agreement, and further warrants and repre-
sents that (i) it has conducted sufficient due diligence with respect to
all items and issues pertaining to this Article 3 and all other matters
pertaining to this Agreement; and (ii) Licensee has adequate knowl-
edge and expertise, or has utilized knowledgeable and expert consul-
tants, to adequately conduct the due diligence, and agrees to accept
all risks inherent herein.
12.1 This Agreement constitutes the entire and only agreement be-
tween the parties for Licensed Subject Matter and all other prior
negotiations, representations, agreements, and understandings are
superseded hereby. No agreements altering or supplementing the
terms hereof may be made except by a written document signed by
both parties. 86
Like the court in Celotex, the court in Nutrasep did not believe that
these provisions were necessarily dispositive of the fraud claim or that
Schulumberger was necessarily applicable. First, the court noted that the
Schlumberger decision involved an effort to resolve an ongoing dispute
arising from the efforts of the parties to terminate a business relationship.
In contrast, according to this court, NTS and TOPC "entered into the
Agreements in order to create a business relationship, not end an existing
one." 87 Second, the court found that TOPC was not represented by
counsel and the provisions were "standard boiler-plate provisions that do
not clearly and unequivocally disclaim reliance on the specific representa-
tions that form the basis for [TOPC's] fraud claims."8 8 Accordingly, the
court denied NTS's motion for summary judgment on TOPC's fraud
claims, finding that the issue of NTS's alleged fraud should be decided by
a jury.89 The court did note, however, that "given the language of the
various clauses, a jury may well find [TOPC's] professions of reliance on
[NTS's] statements lacking in credibility." 90
Because there may well have been a question as to whether TOPC was
a "sophisticated party," and because TOPC was not represented by coun-
sel, this decision could have turned more properly upon a finding that the
Schlumberger criteria had not been satisfied. Unfortunately, the court
chose to limit Schlumberger to its particular facts in the same manner as
Celotex despite consistent past precedent to the contrary.
B. TEXAS CASES BROADLY INTERPRETING SCHLUMBERGER
In contrast to Celotex and Nutrasep is Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Edi-
86. Id. at *6.






torial Caballero.91 Playboy involved a dispute between Playboy Enter-
prises, Inc. ("PEI"), Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V. ("EC"), and Grupo
Siete International, Inc. ("GSI") regarding a licensing agreement. The
licensing agreement specifically allowed EC and GSI to publish and dis-
tribute a Spanish-language version of Playboy in the United States, but
only upon receiving PEI's prior written approval. The License Agree-
ment was for a three-year term beginning January 1, 1997. The first mag-
azine issue was distributed in the United States in October 1997, and the
parties subsequently renegotiated payments and entered into a written
Renegotiation Payment Plan. But in January 1998,.PEI terminated the
Licensing Agreement due to EC's non-payment of royalties and other
payments owed. EC and GSI subsequently asserted several claims
against PEI, including a claim for fraud. Specifically, EC and GSI argued
that PEI made several fraudulent oral representations in connection with
the execution of the License Agreement. In particular, EC and GSI al-
leged that PEI committed fraud when it represented that:
(1) PEI would not enforce or terminate the License Agreement; (2)
renewal was automatic; (3) EC and GSI could import the Spanish-
language edition into the United States; (4) PEI intended to ramp up
circulation after the initial three-year period of the agreement and
was not concerned with "cannibalization;" (5) it was not going to be
a problem to distribute or sell 150,000 copies per month; and (6) the
parties would be partners. 92
PEI denied liability and argued that the license agreement precluded
EC and GSI from maintaining an action for fraud based on the oral rep-
resentations. The court agreed by first noting that the alleged oral repre-
sentations were "directly contradicted by the express unambiguous terms
of the License Agreement," and EC and GSI were not justified in relying
upon them as a matter of law. 93 In addition, the court found EC's and
GSI's reliance on the statements unjustifiable based on the "merger
clause," which provided that:
[T]his Agreement represents the entire understanding of the parties.
None of the terms of this Agreement can be waived or modified ex-
cept by an express agreement in writing signed by the parties. There
are no representations, promises, warranties, covenants[,] or under-
takings other than those contained in this Agreement. 94
In addressing the merger clause, the court directly relied upon the
Schlumberger precedent, holding that, "[wihere a contract is negotiated
at arms-length by sophisticated businessmen represented by counsel, this
type of "merger" clause . . . is enforceable and negates reliance on any
alleged oral representations." 95
91. Playboy Enters. v. Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V., 202 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2006, pet. filed Dec. 27, 2006).
92. Id. at 257.
93. Id.




In addition to EC's and GSI's claims for fraud based on alleged oral
representations, however, EC and GSI also alleged that PEI had commit-
ted fraudulent concealment. Specifically, EC and GSI claimed that PEI
had failed to disclose that Hugh Hefner, PEI's chairman emeritus and
owner of 70% of PEI's stock, was opposed to a Spanish-language version
of Playboy being distributed in the US to the extent it would directly
compete with the English-language edition of Playboy. Having found no
extra-contractual representations and warranties, as a matter of law, the
court went on to find that a claim still existed for fraud by nondisclosure
and that a duty to disclose had arisen because:
Without disclosing Hefner's position on these matters, the informa-
tion relayed to EC and GSI regarding general concerns PEI had
about cannibalism and the publication of the Spanish-language edi-
tion for distribution in the United States was not the whole truth,
was misleading, or conveyed a false impression. Thus, PEI's duty to
disclose the material facts arose in at least one, if not all, of the fol-
lowing situations: when one voluntarily discloses information, he has
a duty to disclose the whole truth; when one makes a representation,
he has a duty to disclose new information when the new information
makes the earlier representation misleading or untrue; and when one
makes a partial disclosure and conveys a false impression, he has the
duty to speak. 96
Having found that PEI had a duty to disclose Hugh Hefner's position
regarding the undesirability of having a Spanish-language edition of Play-
boy, owned by a competitor and being distributed in the U.S., the court
concluded that "EC and GSI can recover for fraud on this basis." '97
This holding appears to be directly contrary to previous Texas court
decisions holding that "alleged nondisclosures are merely the converse of
misrepresentations and are subsumed under any contract language dis-
claiming reliance on affirmative statements." 98 In a properly crafted
nonreliance clause, nonreliance on nondisclosure should be no different
than nonreliance on affirmative representations; in each case the party
has agreed that it is relying only on that which was specifically stated or
disclosed pursuant to the written agreement.
Another more recent federal district court decision, Fair Isaac Corp. v.
Texas Mutual Insurance,9 9 interprets Texas law and comports with the
more traditional broad interpretation of Schlumberger in enforcing non-
reliance provisions. Fair Isaac involved a dispute over a Master Applica-
tion Servicing Agreement under which Fair Isaac Corp was to provide its
"SmartAdvisor" bill-review software to Texas Mutual Insurance Com-
96. Id. at 263.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 369 F.Supp.2d 848, 859
(E.D. Tex. 2004), affd 133 Fed. App'x 944 (5th Cir. 2005). See also Schlumberger Tech.
Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Tex. 1997) (holding disclaimer of reliance clause
precludes claim of fraud by nondisclosure because reliance remains an element of all fraud
claims). See, e.g., West &Bodamer, supra note 1, at 1156-64.
99. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Tex. Mut. Ins., 2006 WL 2022894, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 17, 2006).
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pany ("Texas Mutual"). After Texas Mutual began using SmartAdvisor,
it allegedly "caused a complete collapse of [Texas Mutual's] medical-bill-
review function and caused Texas Mutual to overpay bills by millions of
dollars."'10 0 Fair Isaac sued Texas Mutual when Texas Mutual failed to
pay the contractually agreed upon consideration. In response, Texas Mu-
tual claimed that Fair Isaac had "fraudulent induced it to enter into the
Contract by falsely representing that SmartAdvisor was an existing prod-
uct in commercial use."' 0 1 Fair Isaac denied liability on the counterclaim
and moved for summary judgment based on a merger clause in the con-
tract, which provided that "each party represents and warrants to the
other party that in entering into this Contract it has not relied upon any
representations, promises[,] or assurances from another party not ex-
pressly contained in this Contract. '10 2
The court started its analysis by assessing the viability of the merger
clause as a basis for granting summary judgment. Relying upon the
Schlumberger precedent, the court noted that the effectiveness of a
merger clause was determined by its express language and the circum-
stances surrounding its inclusion in the contract. Based on the facts pre-
sent in Fair Issac, the court held that "[t]he clear, unambiguous contract
language, agreed upon by sophisticated business entities represented by
competent counsel, constitutes a waiver of reliance... [and the Plaintiff],
therefore, is entitled to summary judgment on [Defendantl's pre-contract
counterclaims [for fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresenta-
tion] because there cannot be justifiable reliance on any representations
allegedly made by [Plaintiff]."' 1 3 In sum, the Fair Isaac court rejected the
restrictive reading of the Schlumberger precedent adopted by the recent
Celotex decision.10 4
In yet another more recent Texas court of appeals case, Schlumberger
was again considered dispositive of the efficacy of a nonreliance provision
contained in a contract for the purchase of a car-wash business. In Lang-
guth v. JAT Enterprises, Ltd., 0 5 Langguth purchased the McNeil Car
Wash and Lube from JAT Enterprises, Ltd. ("JAT"), pursuant to a writ-
ten contract that provided in section 11 as follows:
11. PROPERTY CONDITION. Other than provided herein, seller
hereby disclaims, and purchaser hereby waives, any and all warran-
ties of any nature regarding the property. Seller has not made and
100. Id. at *1.
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Texas Mutual also claimed, however, that Fair Isaac had committed fraud and neg-
ligent misrepresentation after the contract had been entered into by representing the readi-
ness of the SmartAdvisor system for use (a subject that was not specifically addressed by
the contract). As to these post-contract claims, the court did not consider the nonreliance
clause applicable. Instead, the court held that because SmartAdvisors' readiness for use
was not a subject covered by the contract, post-contractual representations related to that
subject could form the basis of a fraud claim. Id. at *3-4.
105. No. 03-06-00240-CV, 2007 WL 437186 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 6, 2007, no pet. h.).
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does not make any representations, warranties or covenants of any
kind or character whatsoever, whether express or implied, with re-
spect to: the income, expenses, profit, losses or other aspects of the
operation of the property; the square footage of the property; the
quality or condition of the property; the suitability or safety of the
property for any activities and uses which purchaser may conduct
thereon; compliance by seller and/or the property with any laws,
rules, ordinances, or regulations of any applicable governmental au-
thority, including subdivision and zoning ordinances and building
codes; or the habitability, merchantability, or fitness of the property
for a particular purpose .... [T]he provisions contained in this para-
graph shall survive delivery of the deed. Purchaser shall accept the
property "as is", "where is", and with all faults. Purchaser shall make
its own independent inspection of all aspects of the property and
shall have no recourse whatsoever against seller in the event of dis-
covery of any defects of any kind, latent or patent.10 6
Prior to entering into this contract, the real estate broker for JAT pro-
vided financial statements respecting the car-wash business to Langguth's
broker. Langguth later claimed that he had been induced into entering
into the contract based on misrepresentations about the average monthly
revenue and income of the car-wash business as apparently disclosed in
such financial statements. The trial court granted JAT's motion for sum-
mary judgment and Langguth appealed. On appeal, the court held that in
accordance with the criteria set forth in Schulumberger, including the
finding that Langguth was a sophisticated party, "the disclaimer of reli-
ance in section 11 conclusively negates as a matter of law the element of
reliance on representations about the income and revenue of the car wash
and lube needed to support Langguth's claim of fraudulent
inducement." 07
Welwood v. Cypress Creek Estates, Inc.10 8 is another recent case up-
holding the efficacy of carefully crafted provisions disclaiming extra-con-
tractual representations or obligations. Welwood involved a claim by a
homeowner against the developer of a subdivision in Frisco, Texas. The
homeowner was the chairman of the homebuilding company that pur-
chased the building lots from the developer. In the lot purchase agree-
ment between the homebuilding company, as purchaser, and the lot
developer, as seller, the following "as is" provision was included:
AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SELLER'S UNDERTAK-
INGS AND AGREEMENTS HEREUNDER, SELLER EX-
PRESSLY DISCLAIMS AND PURCHASER ACKNOWLEDGES
AND ACCEPTS THAT SELLER HAS DISCLAIMED MAKING
ANY REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, OR ASSUR-
ANCES WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBDIVISION OR THE
LOTS, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OR ARISING BY OPERATION
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id. at *5.
108. 205 S.W.3d 722, 727 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
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OF LAW, ORAL OR WRITTEN, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIM-
ITED TO, REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES AS TO .e
PHYSICAL CONDITION, °.* HABITABILITY, MERCHANT-
ABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
PURCHASER AGREES THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE SUB-
DIVISION AND THE LOTS IT WILL RELY UPON ITS INSPEC-
TION THEREOF OR ITS DETERMINATION NOT TO
INSPECT THE SAME, AND UPON CLOSING SHALL ACCEPT
THE LOTS IN THEIR "AS IS" CONDITION, WITH ALL
FAULTS, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY TO MERCHANT-
ABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY SPECIFIC PURPOSE. 0 9
The lot on which the homeowner's home was constructed by the
homebuilder was a lake lot that sloped down from the house to the lake.
The homeowner constructed a retaining wall across the back of the lot
and installed a pool and landscaping. The slope failed and significant
damage was caused to the improvements the homeowner had made. The
homeowner alleged that the lot developer had failed to conduct a "slope-
stability analysis" as had been recommended by the lot developer's engi-
neers and that failure was "negligence and a breach of an implied war-
ranty of good and workmanlike development services." 1 10 In response,
the lot developer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the "as
is" clause in the lot development agreement barred these claims. The
trial court agreed. On appeal, the court noted that the purpose of an "as
is" clause is to ensure that the buyer is agreeing "to make his own assess-
ment of the bargain and accept the risk that he may be wrong."1 1 Rely-
ing on the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in Prudential Insurance
Company of America v. Jefferson Associates, Limited,1 2 the court noted
that a valid "as is" clause "negates the element of causation necessary to
recover on claims regarding the physical condition of the property.
1 1 3
As with nonreliance and merger clauses, however, the court also noted
that the "nature of the transaction and the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the agreement must be considered" in determining the effec-
tiveness of an "as is" clause.114 If the "as is" clause is not an important
part of the basis of the bargain, "the parties have unequal bargaining po-
sitions," or the party seeking to invoke the provision deprived the other
party of his right to make an independent determination of the condition
of the property, then an "as is" clause will not be determinative. Finding
nothing in the circumstances of this case to challenge the effectiveness of
the "as is" clause, the court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment.
109. Id. at 726.
110. Id. at 725.
111. Id. at 727.
112. 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).




C. SPECIFIC DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS FROM RECENT TEXAS CASES
REGARDING DISCLAIMER OF RELIANCE
AND MERGER CLAUSES
The importance of carefully crafting your "nonreliance" and "merger"
clauses to remove any possible ambiguity concerning the non-applicabil-
ity of other purported terms or promises outside of the final negotiated
written agreement cannot be overemphasized. This was the issue in Es-
copeta Oil & Gas Corp. v. Songa Management, Inc.,1 15 a case decided by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas during
this Survey period. Escopeta involved the interpretation of a drilling con-
tract, pursuant to which Songa AS, a Norwegian corporation, agreed to
furnish a drilling rig for drilling operations to be conducted in Alaska by
Escopeta Oil & Gas Corporation, a Texas corporation ("Escopeta"). The
Drilling Contract at issue contained a "merger" clause that read as
follows:
Entire Agreement. This Contract constitutes the full understanding
of the parties and a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
their agreement, and shall exclusively control and govern all work
performed hereunder. All representations, offers, and undertakings
of the parties made prior to the effective date hereof, whether oral or
in writing, are merged herein, and no other contracts, agreements, or
work orders, executed prior to the execution of this Contract, shall in
any way modify, amend, alter, or change any of the terms or condi-
tions set out herein. 116
Prior to entering into the Drilling Contract, Escopeta's negotiations
were with Songa AS's affiliate, Songa Management, Inc., a Texas corpo-
ration ("Songa Texas"). Following those initial negotiations, a prelimi-
nary letter agreement was entered into by Songa AS and Escopeta, which
stated that Songa AS or "an affiliate company" would make the rig avail-
able for transport by Escopeta during a specified "loading window range"
between June 1 and June 30, 2006. The letter agreement further provided
for two preliminary payments of $250,000 each to be made by Escopeta
to a Songa AS affiliate company, Songa Drilling PTE. Notably, that same
letter agreement specifically stated that it was " subject to negotiation of
a mutually agreed, definitive contract. ' 117 The letter agreement further
stated that in the absence of a mutually agreed definitive contract, "the
provisions of this letter agreement are void."1 18 The definitive agreement
entered into by virtue of the Drilling Agreement did not address the two
preliminary payments of $250,000, and "omitted any reference [to] a
loading window."11 9 Apparently, Songa Texas was not a party to either
the preliminary letter agreement or the Drilling Contract.
115. No. 1:06-CV-386, 2007 WL 171721, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2007).






The specific issue being addressed by the court in Escopeta was
whether complete diversity of citizenship existed between the parties to
allow the federal court to retain jurisdiction over the case. If Songa Texas
was properly joined as a party in the case, there was not complete diver-
sity of citizenship because Escopeta and Songa Texas were both Texas
corporations. Songa AS and Songa PTE claimed that Songa Texas had
been fraudulently joined as a party to the litigation by Escopeta in order
to specifically defeat diversity and thereby deprive the federal court of
jurisdiction. According to the court, to establish that Songa Texas had
been fraudulently joined, it was necessary for Songa AS and Songa PTE
to prove that "there [was] no possibility that plaintiff would be able to
establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendants [i.e., Songa
Texas] in state court.112 0 Thus, the issue before the court was whether
there was any basis upon which Escopeta could maintain a viable cause of
action against Songa Texas.
Because Songa Texas was not a party to either the Drilling Contract or
the letter agreement, Escopeta alleged that Songa Texas had fraudulently
induced Escopeta to enter into the Drilling Contract by representing that
the rig would be available to be transported to Alaska by Escopeta dur-
ing the "loading window range" of June 1 through June 30, 2006. Noting
that a "third party or agent may be liable for fraudulent inducement even
where it is not a party to the underlying contract," 12 1 the court identified
the six elements of a claim for fraudulent inducement as follows:
(1) the defendant made a material representation concerning an ex-
isting fact; (2) the representation was false when it was made; (3) the
speaker knew the misrepresentation was false, or made it recklessly
without knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the
speaker made the misrepresentation with the intent that it should be
acted upon; (5) the plaintiff acted with justifiable reliance on the mis-
representation; and (6) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result.122
The court quickly concluded that there was "some evidence" to satisfy
the first through fourth and the sixth elements of "a claim for fraudulent
inducement against [Songa Texas]."' 123 Nevertheless, the court was still
required to address the fifth element, i.e., whether Escopeta was justified
in relying upon the alleged representations made outside the Drilling
Contract. Songa AS and Songa PTE asserted that the existence of the
merger clause in the Drilling Contract specifically "negates the element
of justifiable reliance" necessary to sustain a cause of action for fraudu-
lent inducement in Texas.' 24
Because the court's decision only required that there be some "possi-
bility" that Escopeta could sustain a cause of action against Songa Texas
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id. at *7.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *8.
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based on fraudulent inducement, the court was liberal in its approach to
whether the merger clause was effective to defeat any claim of justifiable
reliance on the alleged representations purportedly made by Songa Texas
prior to the execution of the Drilling Contract. First, the court noted that
Schlumberger did not endorse all merger clauses in all circumstances and
noted that "the contract and the circumstances surrounding its formation
determine whether the disclaimer of reliance is binding."' 2 5 Second, the
court further noted that depending on the specific wording of the clause,
the clause may or may not cover extra-contractual tort claims such as
fraud in the inducement. Addressing the merger clause in the Drilling
Contract, the court could not "conclude as a matter of law that Escopeta
had no possibility of recovery against [Songa Texas] on its fraudulent in-
ducement claim."'1 26 According to the court, "the merger clause renders
the Drilling Contract controlling as to the terms contained therein, [but]
the Drilling Contract's silence as to the time of performance militates
against a conclusive determination that it absolves [Songa Texas] of liabil-
ity for any purported misrepresentations concerning this significant issue
[i.e., the time period during which the rig would be available for transport
by Escopeta] made prior to its execution."' 27 Moreover, the court noted
that the letter agreement (which contained a specific reference to the
loading window) was not necessarily superseded by the Drilling Contract.
Indeed, the letter agreement only said it was "void" if there was no subse-
quent definitive contract, and the merger clause only over-rode other
contracts made to the extent such other contracts "modify, amend, alter,
or change" any of the terms of Drilling Contract. Because the drilling
contract did not address time of performance, the court believed that it
was possible that the purported representations and the letter agreement
itself may not have in fact been merged into the Drilling Contract by
virtue of the merger clause.
There are several drafting lessons to take away from Escopeta. First is
the reminder that preliminary letter agreements may be binding. Simply
stating that a preliminary letter agreement contemplates a more formal
definitive document does not render such a letter non-binding. As we
have stated in past surveys, in order to ensure that a preliminary letter
agreement is non-binding, the agreement should say so in clear and un-
ambiguous language. 128 Second, merger clauses should be broad and en-
compass all aspects of prior dealings and negotiations. If the merger
clause is limited to the "subject matter of the agreement" and there were
prior dealings not encompassed by the terms of the agreement, a court
may well find that the merger clause has not merged those prior agree-




128. West & Stasny, supra note 11, at 727-31; West & Chao, supra note 7, at 1411-15;
West & Nelson, supra note 11, at 818-19; West & Treadway, supra note 11, at 818-23; West,
supra note 11, at 1123-38.
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ments or representations. Lastly, never rely solely on a merger clause
but, instead, always join it to a nonreliance provision that clearly and un-
equivocally disclaims reliance on anything not specifically contained in
the definitive agreement.
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF TEXAS OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS
In a previous survey we discussed the uncertainty surrounding whether
a corporation's officers or directors may owe the corporation's creditors a
fiduciary duty when the corporation is within the "zone of insolvency." 129
As we noted, a basic tenet of Texas corporate law is that directors and
officers of a corporation are bound by a strict fiduciary duty to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders.1 30 Historically in Texas, this duty generally
has not been extended to a corporation's creditors. Rather, under the
general rule, directors are regarded as trustees with respect to the share-
holders and the corporation, but agents of the corporation with respect to
third parties (i.e., creditors). 3 1 In the 2004 Survey, we discussed In re
Brentwood Lexford Partners, LLC,132 a decision of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas that advanced the proposi-
tion that, "when a corporation enters the zone of insolvency, the fiduciary
duty shifts from the shareholders to the creditors of the corporation.' '133
However, during this Survey period, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, in Floyd v. Hefner,134 unambiguously re-
jected this proposition and reinstated the prior holdings of the Texas
courts.
In Floyd, the court faced a fact pattern analogous to the facts presented
in the Brentwood case described in the 2004 Survey. Particularly, the
bankruptcy trustee argued that the corporation's officers and directors
(1) owed the creditors a fiduciary duty and (2) breached this duty by
making a series of decisions which eventually depleted corporate assets
and resources that would have been available to the creditors in the after-
math of the corporation's subsequent bankruptcy. First, the trustee ar-
gued that the directors and officers chose to expend corporate resources
to construct a pipeline for oil transport, although there was not sufficient
evidence that the source of oil warranted the pipeline's construction.
129. See West & Nelson, supra note 11, at 810-11.
130. Id.
131. See Dollar v. Lockney Supply Co., 164 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1914, no writ).
132. 292 B.R. 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (citing In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware,
280 B.R. 90, 92 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)). Subsequent to the Hechinger decision, the Dela-
ware Chancery Court clarified that the proper analysis under Delaware law is the "trust
found doctrine;" and that doctrine provides the only recognized basis for holding directors
liable to creditors. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCI Group, Inc., 863 A.2D 772, 790 (Del.
Ch. 2004).
133. 292 B.R. at 272.




Second, the trustee argued that the officers and directors perpetuated a
violation of their fiduciary duty when they decided to dig a "Deep Well"
on the same site where previous explorations indicated a viable source of
oil would likely not be found. Third, the trustee argued that the officers
and directors erred when they voted to enter into a $45 million Secured
Facility to finance these projects. Coincidently, the creditors for these
notes were entities in which some directors individually held significant
interests. In sum, the trustee argued that the directors owed a fiduciary
duty to the creditors of the corporation once it entered the "zone of insol-
vency" and premised this claim on several authorities. Relying on Fifth
Circuit case law, the trustee argued that "officers and directors that are
aware that the corporation is insolvent, or within the 'zone of insolvency'
•.. have expanded fiduciary duties [which extend to] the creditors of the
corporation." 135
Despite the foregoing claims, the court in Floyd rejected the expansion
of corporate fiduciary duties as urged by the trustee. In doing so, the
court in Floyd first made the critical determination that a federal court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction over a bankruptcy proceeding must apply
state law, either in statutory form or as rendered in an opinion of the
highest court. 136 The court then noted that a federal court should not
"adopt innovative theories of law, but must apply that law as it currently
exists."' 137 Looking at the law as it currently existed, as opposed to the
suggestions that had been made in various cases and by various legal
scholars, the court concluded that the holding of Conway v. Bonner
13 8
conclusively resolved the question of whether fiduciary duties were owed
under Texas law by corporate officers and directors to creditors, rather
than shareholders, when a corporation becomes insolvent or nears insol-
vency. According to the court, Conway unequivocally held that merely
because a corporation becomes insolvent does not require the directors
to act as fiduciaries for the corporation's creditors. Rather, unless and
until a corporation is actually the subject of an insolvency proceeding, the
directors' fiduciary duties are owed solely to the shareholders and not to
the creditors. 139 Indeed, according to the Floyd court, the only recog-
nized doctrine, in either Texas or Delaware, that imposes fiduciary duties
on a corporation's officers and directors in favor of a corporation's credi-
tors is the "trust-fund doctrine." Under the Texas trust-fund doctrine,
"directors of a corporation owe the corporation's creditors fiduciary du-
ties only after it is both insolvent and has ceased doing business.
'1 40
135. Carrieri v. Jobs.com, 393 F.3d 508, 533 n.24 (5th Cir. 2004).
136. See Floyd, 2006 WL 2844245, at *9 (relying on Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
48, 55 (1979)).
137. See Gallindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1985).
138. 100 F.2d 786, 787 (5th Cir. 1939).
139. Id. at 787.




While some of the cases decided during this Survey period provide
some cause for continued concern with respect to the preservation of the
corporate form and the efficacy of anti-reliance clauses, other notable de-
cisions provide a healthy dose of optimism for the corporate practitioner
in Texas. In particular, the Willis court's rejection of the implied ratifica-
tion doctrine, as yet another basis on which individual shareholders may
be held liable for corporate obligations, certainly upholds the sanctity of
the corporate form in Texas. In doing so, the Texas Supreme Court force-
fully reinforced the long-established convention of Texas corporation law
that provides that one of the fundamental purposes of incorporation is
the insulation of individual shareholders from liabilities attributable to
the corporation's activities, particularly those based in contract or related
thereto. Additionally, despite the fact that the Celotex decision provided
a sharp deviation from longstanding precedent concerning the enforce-
ability of anti-reliance clauses, subsequent cases decided during this Sur-
vey period rejected this approach and support the inference that the
Celotex holding may represent an anomaly. We trust the Texas Supreme
Court will address this question shortly. Hopefully, the use of an explicit
and expansive anti-reliance clause in a contractual agreement between
sophisticated parties will continue to provide a viable liability manage-
ment mechanism. But we again continue to remind practitioners to re-
main vigilant in the precise language utilized in these clauses. Finally, we
are encouraged by the clarity the Floyd decision provided in the area of
the so-called "shifting" of fiduciary duties in the "zone of. insolvency."
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